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CLEARING THE AIR: FOUR PROPOSITIONS




Privatization is sweeping the globe.1  Since the Reagan-Thatcher
revolution of the 1980s, governments around the world have been
selling off public assets to private owners in order to improve effi-
ciency and increase production.  Between 1985 and 1994, $468 billion
worth of state enterprises were sold off to private investors.2  But pri-
vatization so far has been limited to state enterprises.  Governments
have not, with a few notable and highly controversial exceptions,3 be-
* This article combines and elaborates on ideas developed in two previous works: Daniel
H. Cole, Property Rights on Environmental Goods, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit de Geest eds., forthcoming Sept. 2000); and
DANIEL H. COLE, INSTITUTING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: FROM RED TO GREEN IN
POLAND (1998).
** M. Dale Palmer Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law—Indianapolis.
J.S.D., Stanford Law School; J.D., Northwestern School of Law, Lewis & Clark College; A.M.,
University of Chicago; A.B., Occidental College.
Please direct questions or comments to dancole@iupui.edu.  This article is also available at
<http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/10DELPFCole>.
1. The term “privatization,” as used throughout the law and economics literature, encom-
passes a wide variety of activities by which some public entity conveys property rights to some
private entity or entities—everything from outright giveaways or sales of public lands to the
granting of licenses or concessions under which private firms finance, construct, or manage ho-
tels, airports, wastewater treatment plants, highways, prisons, and schools. See Robert W. Poole,
Jr., Privatization for Economic Development, in THE PRIVATIZATION PROCESS: A
WORLDWIDE PERSPECTIVE 1, 1 (Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill eds., 1996).  On this broad
definition, “privatization” can, but need not be, total.  But privatization’s most vociferous pro-
ponents implicitly adopt a narrower definition, which demands total relinquishment of public
property rights and control.
2. See id.
3. In 1990 the New Zealand government offered for sale more than a million acres of
plantation forests, in order to raise money to pay off the national debt. See Don Wije-wardana,
‘Sale Of The Century’: NZ Forestland For Sale, WORLD WOOD, Feb. 1990, at 24, 24, available in
LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.  But this sale was exceptional.  In 1994 the Conservative
government of British Prime Minister John Major was forced to abandon plans to privatize na-
tional forests in the wake of massive public opposition. See Forestry; Private Woods, THE
ECONOMIST, Feb. 5, 1994, at 57, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File; Philip Greig
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gun selling off their vast natural resource holdings, including forest
lands, parks, and waterways.
This is a mistake, according to some economists who claim that
the same economic arguments favoring private ownership of eco-
nomic producers (polluters and resource users) also support private
ownership of natural resources (i.e., environmental goods).  As Rich-
ard Stroup and Sandra Goodman put it, “government ownership and
control works just as badly with environmental resources as with all
other resources.”4  In their view, privately owned natural resources
would be better managed not only economically but environmentally.
But critics argue that the claims of these so-called “free market envi-
ronmentalists” are unrealistic,5 based on faulty premises,6 overly reli-
ant on anecdotal evidence,7 and oblivious to economies of scale and
the transaction costs of resource privatization.8
Swindon Wiltshire, Privatisation by Stealth of Our National Forests, SCOTLAND ON SUNDAY,
May 29, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File; Owen Bowcott & Erlend Clous-
ton, Forestry Sale Dropped, Campaigners Claim, THE GUARDIAN, May 19, 1994, at 2, available
in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File; Reason Wins over Political Dogma, THE SCOTSMAN,
Apr. 11, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.  Similarly, public opposition
forced the Reagan Administration to hastily abandon plans to privatize public lands in the mid-
1980s. See, e.g., Christopher K. Leman, How the Privatization Revolution Failed, and Why Pub-
lic Land Management Needs Reform Anyway, in WESTERN PUBLIC LANDS: THE MANAGMENT
OF NATURAL RESOURCES IN A TIME OF DECLINING FEDERALISM 110, 113-14 (John G. Francis
& Richard Ganzel eds., 1984).
4. Richard L. Stroup & Sandra L. Goodman, Property Rights, Environmental Resources,
and the Future, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 427, 427 (1992).
5. See, e.g., Peter S. Menell, Institutional Fantasylands: From Scientific Management to
Free Market Environmentalism, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 489, 492 (1992).
6. See, e.g., Alan Randall & Emery N. Castle, Land Resources and Land Markets, in 2
HANDBOOK OF NATURAL RESOURCE AND ENERGY ECONOMICS 571, 613-14 (Allen V. Kneese
& James L. Sweeney eds., 1985) (providing reasons “to be suspicious of normative uses of land
market theory in support of privatization proposals”); Menell, supra note 5, at 493-94 (criticizing
free market environmentalists for simply presuming that market prices would incorporate all
values worth considering); Michael C. Blumm, The Fallacies of Free Market Environmentalism,
15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 371, 379 (1992) (criticizing free market environmentalism for as-
suming that private resource owners would possess environmental information superior to that
possessed by public resource managers).
7. See, e.g., DANIEL W. BROMLEY, ENVIRONMENT AND ECONOMY: PROPERTY RIGHTS
AND PUBLIC POLICY 180 (1991).
8. See, e.g., Menell, supra note 5, at 502 (arguing that “[e]conomies of scale in research
and difficulties in appropriating returns to innovation may enable even highly imperfect public
institutions to outperform private entrepreneurs in some technological fields”); DANIEL H.
COLE, INSTITUTING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: FROM RED TO GREEN IN POLAND 233
(1998) (claiming that the choice of institutions for environmental protection depends on com-
parative transaction cost analyses, which free market environmentalists typically do not pro-
vide).
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This article contributes to the debate about the utility of property
rights for environmental protection by arguing four propositions.
First, environmental protection efforts are inevitably property-based
in that all solutions to the “tragedy of the commons” involve the im-
position of property rights (private/individual, common, or
state/public) on formerly unowned (nonproperty or open-access) re-
sources.  Second, the “privatization” of natural resources—their con-
version from nonproperty or public property to private (common or
individual) property—can, in some circumstances, enhance environ-
mental protection, economic efficiency, or both.  Third, claims that
“privatization” is a necessary and sufficient condition for optimal en-
vironmental protection are inherently implausible, under-supported
by economic theory, and under-determined by the available empirical
evidence.  Fourth, and often overlooked, private ownership of re-
source users/polluters remains vitally important for environmental
regulation to be effective.
PROPOSITION I.
ALL SOLUTIONS TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS ARE  “PROPERTY-
BASED.”
Environmental problems stem, in the first instance, from the in-
sufficient specification of property rights in environmental goods (i.e.,
natural resources).  Aristotle recognized this more than 2,000 years
ago, when he wrote, “that which is common to the greatest number
has the least care bestowed upon it.”9  This implies that some type of
property regime needs to be imposed to conserve resources.  But
property rights never have been imposed on many natural resources,
for a variety of economic, technological, ecological, and cultural rea-
sons.  And history has only too often confirmed Aristotle’s observa-
tion that unowned resources receive “the least care.”
Throughout this century economists have studied relations be-
tween property rights and patterns of resource use and degradation.
In 1911 the Danish economist Jens Warming elaborated on Aris-
totle’s observation about unowned resources in the context of open-
access fisheries.10  Warming’s findings led to further investigations of
9. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS § 1261b 32-33 reprinted in THE BASIC WORKS OF
ARISTOTLE 1148 (Richard McKeon ed. & Benjamin Jowett trans., 1941).
10. See Jens Warming, Om ‘Grundrente’ af Fiskegrunde, NATIONALOKONOMISK
TIDSSKRIFT 495 (1911), reprinted and trans. in Peder Andersen, ‘On Rent of Fishing Grounds’:
A Translation of Jens Warming’s 1911 Article, with an Introduction, 15 HIST. POL. ECON. 391
(1983) (including an introduction by Peder Andersen).
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open-access fisheries by H. Scott Gordon and Anthony Scott in the
1950s.11  In the late 1960s, the biologist Garrett Hardin and the
economist Harold Demsetz provided the classic accounts of, respec-
tively, the depletion of open-access/nonproperty resources and the
evolution of property institutions (i.e., the conversion of nonproperty
to property) to avert their overexploitation by reducing externalities
and transaction costs.12
Hardin’s allegory of the “tragedy of the commons” provides a
framework for analyzing relations between property rights and envi-
ronmental protection.13  Its thesis is that resource depletion and pollu-
tion problems both stem from the incentives created by open access
resources: when no one can exclude anyone else from access and use,
scarce resources ultimately will become polluted and depleted.14  The
only way of avoiding the tragedy is to restrict access and use.15  Hardin
offers two means of doing so.  The first is to privatize the resource—
convert it from nonproperty to private (though not necessarily indi-
vidual) property.16  Privatization would internalize the costs of access
and use decisions to the resource owner(s), who presumably would
have the incentive to conserve the resource over time.17  Hardin’s sec-
ond means for averting the tragedy of the commons is government
regulation.18  Under this regime, conservation is achieved by restric-
tions on access and use that may be externally imposed by govern-
ment or self-imposed by users.
While scholars have discussed and distinguished Hardin’s two
solutions to the tragedy of the commons, many have failed to notice
that both constitute property-based solutions in that each involves the
11. See, e.g., H. Scott Gordon, Economics and the Conservation Question, 1 J.L. & ECON.
110 (1958); H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The Fish-
ery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124 (1954); Anthony Scott, The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Owner-
ship, 63 J. POL. ECON. 116 (1955).
12. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968) [hereinafter
Hardin, Tragedy of the Commons]; Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57
AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967) [hereinafter Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights].
13. See Hardin, Tragedy of the Commons, supra note 12, at 1244.
14. See id. at 1244-45.
15. See id. at 1245.
16. See id.
17. Unfortunately, this presumption—that private owners will always act to conserve natu-
ral resources under their control—does not always hold either in fact or as a matter of economic
theory. See infra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.  But Hardin’s chief insight—that valuable
open-access/nonproperty resources will be unsustainably exploited unless some property rights
regime (private, common, or public/state) is imposed for their protection—nonetheless remains
valid, even though private ownership is not always sufficient to ensure resource conservation.
18. See Hardin, Tragedy of the Commons, supra note 12, at 1245.
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imposition of property rights on formerly open-access/nonproperty
resources.  This is obviously true of privatization, but it is also, though
less obviously, true of government regulation.
When the government regulates access to and use of some re-
source, it imposes public property rights on it.  Similarly, when the
state regulates air pollution, it imposes a system of rights (often im-
plicit) and duties (usually express) with respect to the atmosphere.
Whether it chooses to regulate with command-and-control measures,
such as technology-based standards, or with market-based incentives,
the state imposes on air polluters a legally enforceable duty to comply
with all restrictions on use of (what amounts to) the public’s atmos-
phere.19  What distinguishes this regulatory approach from privatiza-
tion is not the existence or nonexistence of property rights but only
the type of property regime imposed.  Privatization converts non-
property into private (individual or common20) property.  Govern-
19. This carries important implications for the assertion of de facto “rights” to pollute,
commonly found in the writings of property rights economists.  A resource cannot be at once
“open access” (nonproperty) and the subject of property “rights.”  “Open access” signifies the
utter absence of rights or duties with respect to the resource.  At most, prior to the initial alloca-
tion of property rights (and corresponding duties), polluters are “at liberty” to use the atmos-
phere as a storage facility for their waste products.  They have no “right” to do so; but neither
do they have any “duty” to refrain from doing so. See WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD,
FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER
LEGAL ESSYAS 36, 65 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1920).  One implication of this reasoning is
that privatization and regulation both depend on top-down allocations of rights and duties by
the state. Cf. Terry L. Anderson & J. Bishop Grewell, Property Rights Solutions for the Global
Commons: Bottom-Up or Top-Down?, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 73, 82 (admitting that
“bottom-up property rights begin to blur with top-down property rights because both depend on
having the coercive power to exclude”).  For an excellent recent work stressing the state’s re-
sponsibility and incentives for defining and allocating property rights and duties, see ITAI
SENED, THE POLITICAL INSTITUTION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY (1997).
20. Proponents of common property for environmental protection have criticized Hardin
for preferring private (e.g., individual) over common ownership (as those regimes are conven-
tionally defined). See Susan Jane Buck Cox, No Tragedy of the Commons, 7 ENVTL. ETHICS 49,
61 (1985) (“Since it seems quite likely if ‘economic man’ had been managing the commons that
tragedy really would have occurred, perhaps someone else was running the common.”); F.
Berkes et al., The Benefits Of The Commons, 340 NATURE 91, 91-93 (1989).  But Hardin made
no such claim in The Tragedy of the Commons, nor does his analysis in that article support such
a claim. But cf. Carol M. Rose, Expanding the Choices for the Global Commons: Comparing
Newfangled Tradable Allowance Schemes to Old-Fashioned Common Property Regimes, 10
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 45, 46-47 (1999).
Hardin did, however, claim, in an article written a decade later, that private and state own-
ership (or “private enterprise” and “socialism”) were the only viable solutions to the “tragedy of
the commons,” implying that common (private, nonindividual) ownership would not suffice. See
Garrett Hardin, Political Requirements for Preserving Our Common Heritage, in WILDLIFE IN
AMERICA: CONTRIBUTIONS TO AN UNDERSTANDING OF AMERICAN WILDLIFE AND ITS
CONSERVATION 310, 314 (Howard P. Brokaw ed., 1978) [hereinafter Hardin, Preserving Our
Common Heritage]:
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ment regulation typically (but tacitly) converts nonproperty into pub-
lic/state property.
Because both solutions to the tragedy of the commons involve
the imposition of property rights on previously unowned environ-
mental goods, the choice in environmental protection and resource
conservation is not whether to adopt a property-based approach but
which property-based approach or approaches to adopt.  To what ex-
tent should the state assert public rights (res publicae) as opposed to
vesting limited or unlimited private property rights in individual users
(res individuales) or groups of users (res communes)?  The answer to
this question requires a comparative institutional analysis of alterna-
tive property rights regimes, including their relative costs of produc-
tion, exclusion, and administration.21  In some cases, a private-
What is to be done?  Only one thing will suffice: We must renounce the system of the
commons.  The group can agree either to divide up the commons into private property
(Case 1[: private enterprise]), or to appoint a manager for the common property (Case
II).  (A managed commons is socialism and so should no longer be called a commons.)
Neither change can be made as an individual option; the group (or the most powerful
elements of it) must agree on the change and then institute whatever force may be re-
quired to make the change stick.  This is what the 17th century philosopher Thomas
Hobbes wrote about in his book Leviathan, which was the name for the force by which
a community of men must be governed precisely because individual consciences are
not enough.
So, in this later piece, Hardin does take the position that the alternatives of coercion on the one
hand and private property on the other are the only two choices that will prevent the “tragedy
of the commons.” See Rose, supra, at 46-47.  In fact, he specifically cites to William Ophuls
when invoking the notion of “Leviathan” in this later article. See Hardin, Preserving Our Com-
mon Heritage, supra, at 314; see generally WILLIAM OPHULS & A. STEPHEN BOYER, JR.,
ECOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF SCARCITY REVISITED 189 (1992) (emphasis added):
[S]carcity is the source of original political sin: Resources that are scantier than human
wants have to be allocated by governments, for naked conflict would result otherwise.
In the words of the philosopher Thomas Hobbes in Leviathan, human life in an anar-
chic “state of nature” is “solitary, poor, nasty, and short.”  To prevent the perpetual
struggle for power in a war of all against all, there must be a civil authority capable of
keeping the peace by regulating property and other scarce goods.
But, again, nothing in Hardin’s analysis in The Tragedy of the Commons supports the claim that
individual, private property and government coercion are the only two alternatives for solving
the tragedy.  In fact, numerous theoretical and empirical studies dispute such a claim. See, e.g.,
ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990); MAKING THE COMMONS WORK: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND
POLICY (Daniel W. Bromley ed., 1992); PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: SOCIAL
AND ECOLOGICAL ISSUES (Susan Hanna & Mohan Munasinghe eds., 1995).
21. For excellent works comparing institutional alternatives and their costs, see NEIL K.
KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND
PUBLIC POLICY (1994); Thráinn Eggertsson, The Economics of Control and the Cost of Property
Rights, in RIGHTS TO NATURE: ECOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC, CULTURAL, AND POLITICAL
PRINCIPLES OF INSTITUTIONS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 157 (Susan S. Hanna et al. eds., 1996);
Roger G. Noll, Economic Perspectives on the Politics of Regulation, in 2 HANDBOOK OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1253 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989); Carol
M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for Common Resources,
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property regime based on individual ownership may most efficiently
and effectively conserve resources, particularly when private exclu-
sion costs are relatively low but governmental administrative costs
would be particularly high.  A “common” or “state” property regime
may be preferable, however, when the costs of exclusion for a private
owner would be relatively high but administrative costs for govern-
ment regulators are relatively low.  Finally, when administrative and
exclusion costs are both extraordinarily high (reflecting, perhaps, the
technological unfeasibility of controlling access) or the resource itself
is “superabundant,”22 open access may be inevitable, maximally effi-
cient, or both.  Stated as a rule, that property regime is best which,
under the circumstances, would achieve exogenously set environ-
mental protection goals at the lowest cost.23
PROPOSITION II.
PRIVATIZATION CAN, IN SOME CIRCUMSTANCES, ENHANCE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION.
Societies have relied on both of Hardin’s solutions to the tragedy
of the commons.  Some environmental goods, such as land, typically
(though not exclusively, and not at all in socialist economies) have
been protected by private property rights.  But many other environ-
mental goods, including the atmosphere and wildlife, have for various
reasons been protected primarily by government regulation, entailing
the implicit or explicit assertion of public property rights.  These are
generalizations, of course.  Most real-world property regimes gov-
erning environmental goods have been admixtures of individual pri-
vate ownership, non-public common ownership, and state/public
ownership.24
1991 DUKE L.J. 1.  The need for a comparative institutional analysis is also implied by Coase’s
suggestion that efficiency is maximized sometimes by private market transactions, sometimes by
transactions organized within a firm, and sometimes by government regulation. See R.H. Coase,
The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L.& ECON. 1, 16-19 (1960) [hereinafter Coase, Problem of So-
cial Cost].
22. See Harold Demsetz, The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights, 7 J.L. &
ECON. 11, 20 (1964).
23. It should be noted that the environmental goals themselves must be taken as given in
the comparative analysis. See J.H. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY, AND PRICES 39-40 (1968)
(noting that economic analysis can tell us how much it would cost, under alternative approaches,
to achieve a desired environmental protection goal, but cannot determine what that goal should
be).
24. For this reason, J.H. Dales (wisely, in the author’s opinion) has abandoned the conven-
tional but confusing typology of property regimes—private, common, public—to focus instead
on “[j]ust ‘property rights,’ by whomever exercised.” Id. at 61.
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Pollution control today remains heavily dominated by command-
and-control—a pure public property/regulatory approach.  Com-
mand-and-control has been successful in reducing pollution levels,
and in at least some cases, it has done so efficiently.25  But since the
1970s, governments have experimented with various mixed public and
private property/regulatory approaches to environmental protection
primarily in order to improve regulatory efficiency.26  This section dis-
cusses one such mixed property-based approach: marketable “rights”
to pollute.27
The Structure of a Marketable Pollution “Rights” Program
Economists have long criticized the command-and-control ap-
proach to environmental regulation as unnecessarily expensive.28
Since the late 1960s, they have recommended instead the implemen-
tation of marketable pollution “rights” programs as a less costly
means of achieving environmental protection goals.  This idea is sim-
ple enough in theory.29  The government first determines its pollution-
control goal and decides how much of a reduction from current pollu-
tion levels is necessary to achieve it.  It then subtracts the necessary
reduction from current emissions to derive total allowable emissions.
Next, the government unitizes and allocates those allowable emis-
25. See Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, When is Command-and-Control Efficient?
Institutions, Technology, and the Comparative Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory Regimes for
Environmental Protection, 1991 WISC. L. REV. 887, 888, 893.
26. In the mid-1980s, for example, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) intro-
duced a temporary but highly successful program for trading “rights” to lead-content in gaso-
line. See Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons for Theory and
Practice, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 361, 380-91 (1989) [hereinafter Hahn & Hester, Marketable Per-
mits].  Another success story occurred in New Jersey, where the state government used tradable
development rights to preserve the world’s largest pineland forest. See James T.B. Tripp &
Daniel J. Dudek, Institutional Guidelines for Designing Successful Transferable Rights Pro-
grams, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 369, 378-82 (1989).  There were also, of course, less successful ex-
periments with tradable pollution rights. See Hahn & Hester, Marketable Permits, supra, at 391-
96 (discussing the failure of water pollution rights trading programs on Wisconsin’s Fox River
and Colorado’s Dillon Reservoir).
27. Other mixed property-based approaches include Transfer of Development Rights and
Conservation Easements.  Where pollution “rights” trading programs involve an allocation of
public property to private owners, these other mixed property-based approaches to environ-
mental protection often involve transfers of private property rights to public agencies.
28. See DALES, supra note 23, 84-86.  These claims have become so common in recent
years that many economists and legal scholars now simply presume that command-and-control
regulations are inherently inefficient or invariably less efficient than alternative “market-based
approaches,” such as effluent taxes and marketable pollution permits.  This is inaccurate. See
Cole & Grossman, supra note 25, at 893.
29. The theory was first elaborated in DALES, supra note 23, at 92-97.
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sions, in the form of transferable pollution “rights,” among regulated
firms.  In other words, the state conveys (i.e., privatizes) some public
“rights” in the environmental good to private “owners.”  The total
number of “rights” in circulation should equal the total emissions
level the government deemed appropriate to achieve its pollution-
reduction goal.  Thus, the government’s pollution-reduction goal
should be achieved regardless of whether firms can or do trade
“rights” to pollute.
The primary purpose of allowing trading, therefore, is not to re-
duce emissions but to minimize the total cost of reducing emissions.30
By making pollution “rights” transferable, the government “auto-
matically ensures that the required reduction in waste discharge will
be achieved at the smallest possible total cost to society.”31  The mar-
ket facilitates the efficient allocation of pollution-control costs among
regulated firms.  Participating firms with low pollution-control costs
may find it worthwhile to reduce emissions below mandated levels,
leaving them with excess “rights” to sell to firms with higher pollu-
tion-control costs.  In theory, exchanges of pollution “rights” should
occur at any price below the marginal pollution-reduction costs of
some firms and above the marginal pollution-control costs of others
(all else being equal).
What distinguishes transferable pollution “rights” schemes from
command-and-control regulations is not that the former are property-
based while the later are not.  Command-and-control involves the (of-
ten implicit) assertion of public/state-property rights on environ-
mental goods.  The difference lies in the type and extent of property
rights imposed.  Command-and-control regulations assert only public
property rights, while transferable pollution “rights” schemes impose
a combination of public and private property rights on the environ-
mental goods.  It is that combination of public and private rights that
facilitates more efficient pollution reductions.  The public property
rights empower the state to set (and re-set) emissions reduction quo-
tas, which primarily determine the extent of pollution-reduction.  The
private property “rights” conveyed to regulated firms enable them to
30. Trading may, however, facilitate greater net pollution reductions than those required
by the government.  If there are more sellers than buyers in the pollution “rights” market, e.g., if
most regulated firms reduce their emissions below mandated levels, total emissions reductions
will exceed the minimum level set by the state (at least temporarily).  Indeed, this is precisely
what has happened (so far) under the Clean Air Act’s acid rain program (described infra this
section).
31. DALES, supra note 23, at 107.
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allocate the costs of achieving pollution reductions most efficiently
via the market.
But just what “rights” does the state convey to private resource
users/polluters pursuant to a transferable pollution “rights” program?
This question has perplexed legislators and commentators alike, as
the short history of the Clean Air Act’s acid rain program illustrates.
The “acid deposition control” program established in Title IV of
the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments32 sought to halve sulfur dioxide
(SO2) emissions by the year 2000.  A new, two-phase transferable
emissions “allowance” scheme was established to accomplish this
goal.33  In Phase I, Congress issued emissions “allowances” (each of
which equaled one ton of SO2 emissions
34) for the 110 “dirtiest” power
plants in 21 states.35  The total number of allowances allocated
equaled approximately one-half the total annual emissions of all 110
plants,36 in order to achieve a 3.5 million ton reduction in aggregate
SO2 emissions before the second phase of emissions reductions takes
effect in the year 2000.37  The allowances were allocated to individual
generating units based on their average quantity of fossil fuel con-
sumed during the three-year period 1985-87 (assuming 2.5 pounds of
SO2 for each million BTUs of fuel input
38).39  In Phase II, the goal will
be to reduce SO2 emissions from all but the smallest generating units
40
by approximately an additional 5 million tons (based on a formula of
1.2 pounds per million BTUs of fossil fuel input during the 1985-87
period41).42
Most pollution reductions under this program have been pre-
determined by the administratively set emissions quotas.  These quo-
tas are traditional “commands,” but they have been issued without at-
32. Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-671
(1994)).
33. See 42 U.S.C.  § 7651b (1994).
34. See 42 U.S.C.  § 7651c(a)(2) (1994); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. NO.
GAO/RCED-95-30, AIR POLLUTION: ALLOWANCE TRADING OFFERS AN OPPORTUNITY TO
REDUCE EMISSIONS AT LESS COST 18 (1994) [hereinafter U.S. GAO]; ROBERT V. PERCIVAL
ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 826 (2d ed. 1996).
35. See U.S. GAO, supra note 34, at 2; PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 34, at 828; Byron
Swift, The Acid Rain Test, ENVTL. F., May-June 1997, at 16, 19.
36. See Swift, supra note 35, at 19.
37. See U.S. GAO, supra note 34, at 16.
38. See 42 U.S.C.  § 7651c(a)(2)(B) (1994).
39. See U.S. GAO, supra note 34, at 18 n.4.
40. See 42 U.S.C.  § 7651d(b)(1) (1994).
41. See 42 U.S.C.  § 7651d(a)(2) (1994).
42. See U.S. GAO, supra note 34, at 16.
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tendant “controls.”  The Act does not specify how sources are to
meet their emissions reduction targets.  In fact, the law does not even
require sources to reduce emissions to the levels set by Congress but
only to possess allowances equal to their actual emissions.  Congress
designed the program to utilize market forces by expressly authoriz-
ing the nationwide buying and selling of emissions allowances.
Sources that can economically reduce their emissions below required
levels can sell or bank their excess allowances.  Those with higher
costs of controlling emissions can purchase extra allowances, i.e., in-
crease their quota, rather than reduce emissions pursuant to the ini-
tial allocations.
But just what are these emissions “allowances?”  Do they consti-
tute conveyances of “property” from the government to regulated
utilities?  Well, yes and no.  According to the terms of § 403(f) of the
1990 Clean Air Act Amendments:
An allowance allocated under this subchapter is a limited authori-
zation to emit sulfur dioxide . . . .  Such allowance does not consti-
tute a property right.  Nothing in this subchapter or in any other
provision of law shall be construed to limit the authority of the
United States to terminate or limit such authorization . . . .  Allow-
ances, once allocated to a person by the Administrator, may be re-
ceived, held, and temporarily or permanently transferred in accor-
dance with this subchapter and the regulations of the
Administrator . . . .43
This provision has two purposes.  One is to placate environmentalists,
many of whom are offended by the very notion of “rights” to pollute
(let alone the idea that firms might actually profit from selling excess
“rights” to pollute).44  Even more importantly, Congress wanted to
ensure that the program’s pollution-reduction goals would ultimately
be achieved.  By specifying that allowances are not property rights
and by expressly authorizing the EPA to terminate or limit allow-
ances, Congress empowered the agency to implement the program
without fear of having to compensate utilities for “taking” their al-
lowances.
But § 403(f) is premised on the confusion between property
rights in something and the thing itself.  It provides that an emissions
allowance is not “a property right” but expressly recognizes property
43. 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(f) (1994).
44. See Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Where Did All the Markets Go? An Analysis
of EPA’s Emissions Trading Program, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 109, 142-43 (1989) [hereinafter Hahn
& Hester, Where Did the Markets Go?].
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rights in emission allowances.45  According to the section’s express
terms, utilities can receive, hold (i.e., possess), and transfer (i.e., al-
ienate) allowances.  And although the statute does not expressly say
so, the utilities can exclude all others besides the government from in-
terfering with their possession, use, and disposition of allowances.
These are certainly valuable property rights in emission allowances.46
Indeed, there already has been litigation over disputed “ownership”
of emission allowances.47
The Clean Air Act’s acid rain program mixes public and private
property rights in emission allowances.  The allocation of allowances
constitutes a conveyance by the government of some, but not all, of
the public’s property rights in the atmosphere to the regulated utili-
ties.  The specific property rights conveyed include limited rights to
possess, use, and exclude.  Meanwhile, pursuant to § 403(f) the gov-
ernment expressly reserves the right to terminate or limit the allow-
ances.
From an economic point of view, the legal characterization of
property rights in emission allowances is less important than their in-
centive effects for market participants.  The less secure property
rights are, the less likely potential buyers will be to invest in them.48
Leaseholds, for example, have lower market value than freeholds
precisely because of their more limited tenure and security.  And
there is every reason to suspect that defeasible pollution allowances
would have lower market values than absolute pollution rights.49
Completely insecure rights would have a market value approximating
zero, at which price the market would simply disappear.50
45. 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(f) (1994).
46. For a discussion of de facto rights that are property rights except in name, see
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 51-53 (5th ed. 1992) (using broadcast fre-
quencies as an example of de facto property rights); Bruce Yandle, Grasping for the Heavens: 3-
D Property Rights and the Global Commons, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 13, 20 & n.32
(1999) (referring to Posner’s broadcast frequencies example and also offering the example of
Japanese sunshine rights as de facto property rights).  While de facto property rights clearly do
exist, one must also be cognizant of their extent. See supra text accompanying note 19.
47. See, e.g., Ormet Corp. v. Ohio Power Co., 98 F.3d 799 (4th Cir. 1996).
48. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 46, at 36.
49. See Hahn & Hester, Marketable Permits, supra note 26, at 379 (“To the extent that fu-
ture confiscation is probable, the value of rights is reduced and fewer advantageous trades can
be made.”).
50. The EPA has confronted this problem in previous experiments with emissions trading.
Consequently, commentators expect the agency to treat sulfur dioxide emissions allowances as
if they were property rights, except in unusual circumstances. See Jeanne M. Dennis, Smoke for
Sale: Paradoxes and Problems of the Emissions Trading Program of the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1990, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1101, 1137 (1993).  The risk of confiscation should, therefore,
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The limitations on emission allowances under the Clean Air Act
unquestionably lower the economic value of the allowances, as sev-
eral commentators have noted.51  But they do not render the allow-
ances worthless, any more than a leasehold, usufruct, or defeasible
fee is worthless because it is not permanent or absolute.  To claim
that emission allowances are not property rights simply because they
are neither absolute nor perpetual would be tantamount to claiming
that fee simple is the only legitimate estate in land.
Pollution “Rights” Trading in Practice
So far, the Clean Air Act’s sulfur dioxide emissions trading pro-
gram for acid rain has been an unalloyed environmental and eco-
nomic success.  As of November 1995, 23 million allowances worth
more than $2 billion had been traded in more than 600 transactions
under the acid rain program.52  The result has been a far greater than
expected reduction in sulfur dioxide emissions, and a 10 to 25 percent
decline in acid precipitation in the Northeast.53  According to the
EPA, by 1995 the 110 participating power plants had reduced aggre-
gate emissions of sulfur dioxide well below the 8.9 million ton statu-
tory limit;54 total emissions in 1995 were 5.3 million tons, 39 percent
below the target ceiling and more than 50 percent below 1980 emis-
sion levels.55  The larger than expected reductions flooded the market
with cheaper than expected allowances; prices fell from an average of
be remote. See Adam J. Rosenberg, Emissions Credit Futures Contracts on the Chicago Board of
Trade: Regional and Rational Challenges to the Right to Pollute, 13 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 501, 508
n.54 (1994).
51. See, e.g., Hahn & Hester, Where Did the Markets Go?, supra note 44, at 116-17 (noting
that uncertainty regarding property rights in emissions creates a disincentive for firms to engage
in emissions trading).
52. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 34, at 830; Cole & Grossman, supra note 25, at 932.
53. See Swift, supra note 35, at 17; Cole & Grossman, supra note 25, at 932.
54. See 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(a)(1) (1994) (setting out the statutory limit—the emissions cap—
of 8.90 million tons of sulfur dioxide); ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, REP.
NO. DOE/EIA-0582(97), THE EFFECTS OF TITLE IV OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS
OF 1990 ON ELECTRIC UTILITIES: AN UPDATE 4 (1997) [hereinafter U.S. DOE]; Swift, supra
note 35, at 17 (“Results from 1995 and 1996 show that . . . utilities have over-complied by emit-
ting 30 percent less sulfur dioxide than the program’s emissions cap allows.”).
55. See U.S. DOE, supra note 54, at 4; Alec Zacaroli, Leading the News: Air Pollution:
Utilities Acheive 100 Percent Compliance with EPA Acid Rain Program, Report Says, Env’t Rep.
(BNA) (Aug. 12, 1996), available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNANED File; Cole & Grossman,
supra note 25, at 932.
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around $325 per allowance in 1992 to an average of $68 per allowance
in 1996.56
In economic terms, the program has been described as “a terrific
bargain.”57  The lowest estimates of its annual health benefits—$12
billion—are four times higher than the highest estimates of annual
program costs.58  And those calculations exclude more difficult-to-
quantify environmental benefits, such as reduced damage from acid
rain to forests, waterways, and architecture.59  The total cost-savings
from trading (as opposed to alternative regulatory controls) are diffi-
cult to estimate, but they must be substantial.60  Consider that just
four utilities have estimated their aggregate savings from purchasing
allowances rather than installing scrubbers at $706 million.61  This fig-
ure almost matches the total annual costs of compliance with Phase I
reduction requirements for all participants, estimated at $836 million
through 1995.62
The success of the acid rain program has encouraged scholars
and policymakers to innovate new applications for conserving ocean
resources,63 endangered species habitat,64 and wetlands.65  But ques-
tions have been raised about the utility of marketable pollution
“rights” for every institutional and ecological context.66  Indeed, not
56. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 34, at 831-32; Alec Zacaroli, Air Pollution: Acid Rain
Allowance Auction Generates $32 Million in Sales; Prices Up Dramatically, Chem. Reg. Rep.
(BNA) (Mar. 28, 1997), available in LEXIS, BNA Library, CHEMRG File; Cole & Grossman,
supra note 25, at 932.
57. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 34, at 832; Cole & Grossman, supra note 25, at 933.
58. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 34, at 832; Cole & Grossman, supra note 25, at 933. See
also DALLAS BURTRAW ET AL., THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF REDUCING ACID RAIN 26 (Re-
sources for the Future Discussion Paper 97-31-REV, 1997) (concluding that the benefits of the
acid rain program exceed its costs “by a substantial margin”).
59. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 44, at 832; Cole & Grossman, supra note 25, at 933
n.145.
60. See Cole & Grossman, supra note 25, at 933.
61. See U.S. GAO, supra note 34, at 33-34.  The four utilities were Central Illinois Public
Service, Illinois Power Company, Duke Power, and Wisconsin Electric Power Company. See id.
62. See U.S. DOE, supra note 54, at 12 .
63. See Carrie A. Tipton, Note, Protecting Tomorrow’s Harvest: Developing a National
System of Individual Transferable Quotas to Conserve Ocean Resources, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 381,
397-400 (1995).
64. See David Sohn & Madeline Cohen, Note, From Smokestacks to Species: Extending the
Tradeable Permit Approach from Air Pollution to Habitat Conservation, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
405, 411-15 (1996).
65. See William W. Sapp, The Supply-Side and Demand-Side of Wetlands Mitigation
Banking, 74 OR. L. REV. 951, 967-70 (1995).
66. For example, see Kathleen A. Miller, Water Banking to Manage Supply Variability, 1
ADVANCES IN THE ECONOMICS OF  ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES: MARGINAL COST RATE
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every marketable pollution “rights” program has been as successful as
the Clean Air Act’s acid rain program.67  However, that program does
illustrate the potential economic and environmental benefits of lim-
ited privatization of environmental goods.68
PROPOSITION III.
CLAIMS THAT A SINGLE INSTITUTION—PRIVATE PROPERTY—IS THE
FIRST-BEST SOLUTION TO ALL ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS IN THIS
SECOND-BEST WORLD ARE INHERENTLY IMPLAUSIBLE, UNDER-
SUPPORTED BY ECONOMIC THEORY, AND UNDER-DETERMINED BY
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE.
If the limited privatization of marketable pollution “rights” pro-
grams enhances both the efficiency and effectiveness of environ-
mental protection, then should not the complete privatization of envi-
ronmental goods maximize both efficiency and effectiveness?  On the
theory that if X is good then more of X must be better, free market
environmentalists contend that the complete privatization of all envi-
ronmental goods would result in optimal environmental protection.
DESIGN AND WHOLESALE WATER MARKETS 185 (Darwin C. Hall ed., 1996), and Barton H.
Thompson, Jr., Institutional Perspectives on Water Policies and Markets, 81 CAL. L. REV. 673
(1993), which both identify institutional impediments to successful trading programs in water
pollution rights.
67. See supra note 26 (discussing various successful and unsuccessful experiments with
trading schemes).
68. Based on the success of the acid rain trading program, many environmental policymak-
ers now advocate the use of tradable permit systems across a wide spectrum of environmental
problems, including at the international level.  See, e.g., Sohn & Cohen, supra note 64, at 409
(advocating a tradable permit system for habitat conservation); Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global
Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 798 (1999)
(stating that global environmental protection should presumptively favor quantity-based trad-
able allowances).  Their advocacy is paying off.  The recently concluded Kyoto Protocol climate-
change agreement, for example, calls for the institution of a global CO2 trading system. See
Kyoto Protocol, Dec. 10, 1997, art. 6, 37 I.L.M. 22, 35 (not yet in force) (84 signatories and 22
Parties as of Jan. 20, 2000), available at <http://www.unfccc.de/resource/docs/cop3/l07a01. htm>.
However, it is unclear that a trading system would necessarily be more efficient than a technol-
ogy-based command-and-control system for reducing global greenhouse gas emissions, given
the significant institutional and technological constraints of many signatory countries.  Those
constraints are especially problematic with respect to emissions monitoring, which is a necessary
governmental function to ensure the integrity of the trading market.  As several authors have
noted, monitoring costs tend to be higher for “market-based” systems than for technology-
based command-and-control. See, e.g., Cole & Grossman, supra note 25, at 904-05, 920-22; Mi-
chael T. Maloney & Bruce Yandle, Estimation of the Cost of Air Pollution Control Regulation,
11 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 244, 247 (1984); cf. CLIFFORD S. RUSSELL ET AL., ENFORCING
POLLUTION CONTROL LAWS 3 (1986).  If that cost-differential is high enough, then the effi-
ciency advantages of emissions trading may be more than offset.  At the very least, policymak-
ers ought to be suspicious of studies that claim great efficiency advantages for tradable permit
systems without considering differential monitoring costs.
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Indeed, they have criticized marketable pollution “rights” programs
as a form of “market socialism.”69  No doubt such programs constitute
an improvement over the “feudalism” of command-and-control,70 but
free market environmentalists reject the need for any form of gov-
ernment environmental regulation.  Instead, they promote a complete
private property rights solution to environmental problems.
The theory of free market environmentalism challenges the con-
ventional welfare economics story concerning the causes of environ-
mental problems.  It does not deny that environmental problems stem
from market failures but notes that those market failures are them-
selves the result of incompletely specified property rights in environ-
mental goods.  Government remedies that ignore that root cause are
at best palliative.  The only way to cure the underlying cause of the
market failure—and, thus, the only truly appropriate and effective
remedy for environmental problems—is to completely specify private
property rights in environmental goods, i.e., privatize them.  Free
market environmentalists claim that a system of completely specified
and protected property rights should prevent inefficient externalities
and, therefore, market failures.  And in the absence of market fail-
ures, government regulation for environmental protection is neither
necessary nor justified.
It is important to recognize that the theory of free market envi-
ronmentalism cannot be explained solely by reference to the “tragedy
of the commons” model, which merely recognizes the need to estab-
lish some property regime (public, common, or private) to limit access
to, and use of, increasingly scarce resources.71  The free-marketeers
argue further that public property regimes are inevitably insufficient
for effective and efficient conservation.  The complete privatization of
environmental goods, on the other hand, constitutes both a sufficient
and necessary condition for optimal environmental protection.
69. See, e.g., TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET
ENVIRONMENTALISM 158-59 (1991) (stating that “tradeable permits do not represent a truly
free-market approach”); Robert W. McGee & Water E. Block, Pollution Trading Permits as a
Form of Market Socialism and the Search for a Real Market Solution to Environmental Pollu-
tion, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 51, 52 (1994) (stating that, as presently advocated and applied,
tradable emission rights systems are “really just a form of market socialism”).
70. See, e.g., Bruce Yandle, Escaping Environmental Feudalism, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 517, 517, 536-37 (1992) (“United States environmental policy is a modern-day form of
feudalism . . . .  The nationalization of environmental assets that occurred in the late 1960s and
early 1970s effectively reduced the centuries-old scope of action for common-law remedies . . . .
[Through this national system of command-and-control environmental regulation, t]he United
States has returned to the law of the manor.”).
71. See supra notes 12-21 and accompanying text.
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This is a logical but unwarranted extension from Harold Dem-
setz’s historical and theoretical explanations of the emergence of pri-
vate property rights (in virtually all societies, at some point in their
socioeconomic development) to conserve scarce resources by reduc-
ing externalities and transaction costs.72  Demsetz has never claimed
that privatization is the exclusive efficient response to increasing scar-
city.  In stark contrast to free market environmentalists, he expressly
maintains that efficiency is at least sometimes maximized through
government action rather than market transactions.73
In arguing that a single institution—private property—consti-
tutes the first-best solution for all environmental problems, regardless
of institutional and technological contexts, free market environmen-
talists have taken upon themselves a tremendous burden of proof.  It
is inherently implausible, in a second-best world in which transaction
costs are always positive and usually quite significant, that any single
institution would constitute a universal first-best solution.74  Never-
theless, the advocates of complete privatization attempt to satisfy
their heavy burden with arguments about the differential incentives
of private property owners and government regulators, anecdotal
evidence of government mismanagement of publicly owned re-
sources, and anecdotal evidence of useful conservation efforts by pri-
vate resource owners.
Like private owners, the politicians and bureaucrats who manage
public property seek to maximize their self-interest.75  But their incen-
tives are quite different from private owners because bureaucrats and
72. See Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, supra note 12, at 350.
73. See Harold Demsetz, The Cost of Transacting, 82 Q.J. ECON. 33, 34 (1968) (“For there
are cases in which the cost of government action is less than the cost of transacting in markets.
In such cases, we will employ government action that realigns resources more completely than
can be achieved economically in the market place.”).  See also Coase, Problem of Social Cost,
supra note 21, at 18 (explaining that government regulation may, if only on rare occasions, pro-
vide a more efficient solution to social problems than markets or firms).
74. See Coase, Problem of Social Cost, supra note 21, 15-19; KOMESAR, supra note 21, at 5-
6.
75. See ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 69, at 4, 10-11; RICHARD L. STROUP & JOHN A.
BADEN, NATURAL RESOURCES: BUREAUCRATIC MYTHS AND ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT 43-45 (1983) [hereinafter STROUP & BADEN, NATURAL RESOURCES]; John
Baden & Richard Stroup, Natural Resource Scarcity, Entrepreneurship, and the Political Econ-
omy of Hope, in ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A RECONCILIATION 117, 132-33 (Wal-
ter E. Block ed., 1990) (“[Bureaucrats] are not selfless repositories of virtue and wisdom whose
only mission is to advance the public interest.  Bureaucrats appear to be approximately as self-
interested as others, but they operate in an environment in which they are buffered and insu-
lated from the negative consequences of their actions.”) [hereinafter Baden & Stroup, Political
Economy of Hope].
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politicians do not bear the costs of poor management decisions.76
They also tend to have shorter time-horizons and higher discount
rates than private resource owners.77  This is because “there is no
‘voice of the future’ in government equivalent to the rising market
price of an increasingly valuable resource.”78  For politicians facing re-
election in two-, four-, or six-year cycles, the choice between pre-
serving natural resources for unborn generations and developing
them for living generations of voters is obvious: future generations
always receive the short end of the stick.79
Bureaucrats never face re-election, but their incentive structure
is closer to that of politicians than private owners.  They do not seek
to maximize the value of the assets in their control but to maximize
budget allocations and administrative turf, while minimizing congres-
sional oversight and interference.  As a consequence, they respond
not to market signals but to political circumstances, even if doing so
“reduces the total value of production.”80  The usual result of public
76. As ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 69, at 14, put it, the “political sector operates by ex-
ternalizing costs.”  It is also true that private resource owners externalize costs, but only because
property rights in environmental goods are not completely specified. See id. at 20 (admitting
that market transactions fail but usually because the costs of monitoring and measuring resource
use are high, i.e., property rights are not well-specified).
77. Many environmental management issues involve significant time-preference aspects.
For example, an old-growth forest harvested today will not be available for future generations
of users or viewers.  All resources owners, whether public or private, implicitly or explicitly
weigh present use values against anticipated future benefits, if current use is foregone.  They do
so by discounting the expected future benefits, reducing them to present day dollars, which can
then be directly compared with current use values.  If the discounted expected future value is
greater than the present use value, the resource will be conserved (i.e., invested for future use);
otherwise, it will be presently used or consumed.  The comparison of present and future values
depends predominantly on two variables: the estimation of future value and the owner’s subjec-
tive discount rate, i.e., the interest rate at which they reduce future values to present dollars.  A
low discount rate favors longer-term investments or conservation; a higher discount rate tends
to favor current usage or consumption.
78. STROUP & BADEN, NATURAL RESOURCES, supra note 75, at 24.  Note that this claim
turns on its head a standard welfare economics justification for public ownership of environ-
mental goods: that the discount rates of private owners tend to exceed the social rate of dis-
count, resulting in too rapid resource use and depletion. See, e.g., Harold Hotelling, The Eco-
nomics of Exhaustible Resources, 39 J. POL. ECON. 137, 144 (1931).
79. Studies of congressional voting behavior on environmental legislation indicate that
legislators do not vote for or against policies based on abstract conceptions of inter-generational
public welfare but on the estimated costs and benefits to living and voting constituents. See B.
Peter Pashigian, Environmental Regulation: Whose Self-Interests Are Being Protected?, 23 ECON.
INQUIRY 551, 580-81 (1985).  Of course, if living voters themselves are interested in conserving
resources for future generations, then congressional voting behavior presumably would reflect
the interests of both.
80. GARY D. LIBECAP, LOCKING UP THE RANGE: FEDERAL LAND CONTROLS AND
GRAZING 9 (1981) [hereinafter LIBECAP, LOCKING UP THE RANGE].
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resource management, according to free market environmentalists, is
government failure to allocate environmental goods efficiently or ef-
fectively.  Indeed, the government itself becomes “the cause of envi-
ronmental problems.”81
The advocates of complete privatization illustrate this with nu-
merous anecdotes of bureaucratic mismanagement of publicly owned
resources.  Gary Libecap, for example, has explained how govern-
ment range land management practices (especially those limiting the
establishment of secure property rights by ranchers) have led to over-
grazing on, and desertification of, range land resources.82  Richard
Stroup and John Baden, among others,83 have pointed to the ineffi-
ciencies and environmental harm resulting from federal timber man-
agement policies, most notably below-cost timber sales in the Na-
tional Forests.84  Terry Anderson has criticized the Federal Bureau of
Reclamation for undertaking uneconomic and environmentally harm-
ful water development projects.85  And Richard Epstein, among oth-
ers,86 has decried the perverse incentives created by well-meaning but
misguided federal wildlife preservation policies.87  The entire history
of public resource management, Thomas Borcherding laments, is an
immense tragedy of the “political commons,”88 the only solution to
which is complete privatization.
81. Baden & Stroup, Political Economy of Hope, supra note 75, at 132.
82. See LIBECAP, LOCKING UP THE RANGE, supra note 80, at 14, 28, 31-36.  See also
CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND THE FUTURE
OF THE AMERICAN WEST 80, 111-12 (1992) (“Overgrazing has put nearly 10 percent of all land
in the American West in a state of severe desertification . . . . [A]n impressive body of evidence
indicates that the root concern is neither subsidies nor numbers of cattle.  Rather, the real
[problem] is poor cattle management.”).
83. See, e.g., William F. Hyde, Compounding Clear-Cuts: The Social Failures of Public
Timber Management in the Rockies, in BUREAUCRACY VS. ENVIRONMENT: THE
ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS OF BUREAUCRATIC GOVERNANCE 186 (John Baden & Richard L.
Stroup eds., 1981).  See also, e.g., Robert Repetto, Subsidized Timber Sales from National Forest
Lands in the United States, in PUBLIC POLICIES AND THE MISUSE OF FOREST RESOURCES 353,
357-58, 379 (Robert Repetto & Malcolm Gillis eds., 1988) (“Despite difficulties in evaluation,
the weight of evidence indicates substantial economic inefficiencies in national forest manage-
ment . . . .”).
84. See Richard Stroup & John Baden, Externality, Property Rights and the Management of
Our National Forests, 16 J.L. & ECON. 303, 309-11 (1973).
85. See Terry L. Anderson, Enviro-Capitalism vs. Enviro-Socialism, KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y, Winter 1995, at 35, 36.
86. See, e.g., ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 69, at 58-59.
87. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 291-96 (1995).
88. See Thomas E. Borcherding, Natural Resources and Transgenerational Equity, in
ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A RECONCILIATION 95, 99 (Walter E. Block ed., 1990).
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Privatization would replace the decision-making of bureaucrats
and politicians with that of private owners, whose incentive struc-
tures, according to free market environmentalists, are conducive to
economically and environmentally sound resource management.
Most importantly, the information provided by market prices pro-
vides incentives for private resource owners (but not public resource
managers) to take a longer-term perspective.  As Stroup and Good-
man explain,
The current market price reflects the present, discounted value of
all future revenue flows that are expected to stem from [an] asset.
The ability to capitalize future value into an asset’s present value
induces property owners to consider the long-term implications of
their asset-use decisions.  It creates a strong incentive for owners to
consider fully the effects of deferring consumption of their asset re-
turns.  Furthermore, it implies that property owners will be respon-
sible to future users.  Any activity that reduces the future benefits
or increases the future costs stemming from an asset results in a re-
duction of that asset’s current value.  As soon as an appraiser or po-
tential buyer anticipates future problems, his assessment of a prop-
erty’s value falls, and the owner’s wealth declines immediately . . . .
Potential buyers interact with owners to maximize asset value over
time.89
Free market environmentalists surely are right about the envi-
ronmental inadequacies and economic inefficiencies of bureaucratic
resource management.  Private resource ownership is without a doubt
economically and environmentally preferable to public ownership
and regulation in some (perhaps many) cases.  But that hardly proves
that the complete privatization of all environmental goods is both
necessary and sufficient for effective and efficient environmental pro-
tection.  To prove that, advocates must show that privately owned re-
sources are inevitably better conserved and protected from pollution
than publicly owned and managed resources.  At the very least, they
need to show that the benefits of privatization would always outweigh
the costs, including the transaction costs.90  This would require a sys-
89. Stroup & Goodman, supra note 4, at 431-32.  Stroup and Goodman fail to mention that
only economic values are maximized through this interaction.  They simply presume that market
prices capture all environmental values worth considering.  This neglects the fact that there are
no markets—hence no market prices—for certain ecological values; and there might not be even
if all environmental goods were privatized. See Menell, supra note 5, at 493-94.
90. Transaction costs arguably are the key to understanding institutional choice. See R.H.
Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390-92 (1937) (arguing that transaction costs
explain why certain economic activities are organized in firms, rather than markets).
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tematic study of the costs and benefits of privatization, for which an-
ecdotes are no substitute.
Meanwhile, several empirical and theoretical economic studies
suggest that private ownership is not the best solution to every envi-
ronmental problem.  Colin Clark’s studies of the economics of whal-
ing, for example, demonstrate that the “extermination of the entire
[whale] population may appear as the most attractive policy, even to
an individual resource owner,” when “(a) the discount (or time pref-
erence) rate sufficiently exceeds the maximum reproductive potential
of the population, and (b) an immediate profit can be made from har-
vesting the last remaining animals.”91  Daniel Bromley reminds us of
the Dust Bowls that resulted when supposedly “‘omniscient’ private
entrepreneurs” plowed up the prairies against the advice of govern-
ment agricultural experts.92  More recently, in the late 1980s private
timber owners accelerated harvests beyond sustainable levels in order
to avert or pay for junk bond-financed hostile takeovers.93  In these
cases, private ownership did not guarantee the low discount rates and
long time horizons that are necessary for resource conservation.
Free market environmentalists have, on occasion, acknowledged
the need for transaction cost analyses.  In their 1991 book, Free Mar-
ket Environmentalism, Terry Anderson and Donald Leal concede
that “[p]roperty rights are costly to define and enforce.”94  In an ear-
lier work, Anderson and co-author Peter Hill explicitly recognized
that “the definition and enforcement process may preclude whatever
gains might have been realized by the establishment of [property]
rights.”95  Yet, one is hard pressed to locate in the free market envi-
91. Colin W. Clark, Profit Maximization and the Extinction of Animal Species, 81 J. POL.
ECON. 950, 951 (1973).  See also Colin W. Clark, The Economics of Overexploitation, 181 SCI.
630, 630 (1974); Bruce A. Larson & Daniel W. Bromley, Property Rights, Externalities, and Re-
source Degradation: Locating the Tragedy, 33 J. DEV. ECON. 235, 242 (1990); Edella Schlager &
Elinor Ostrom, Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis, 68
LAND ECON. 249, 256 (1992).
92. BROMLEY, supra note 7, at 171.
93. See THOMAS MICHAEL POWER, LOST LANDSCAPES AND FAILED ECONOMIES 138
(1996).
94. ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 69, at 167.
95. Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, Privatizing the Commons: An Improvement?, 50 S.
ECON. J. 438, 438 (1983):
[U]nder certain institutional arrangements, the establishment of private rights to re-
sources can leave a society no better off than when rights were held in common.  In
other words, the “tragedy of the commons” may be no worse than the rent dissipation
that can result in the process of private property establishment.
Others, including several critics of free market environmentalism, have made the same point.
See, e.g., Susan Hanna et al., Property Rights and Environmental Resources, in PROPERTY
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ronmentalist literature efforts to systematically assess the transaction
costs of privatization.96  Absent such efforts, there is reason for skep-
ticism about their blanket privatization prescriptions for domestic and
international environmental policy.
There is a weaker version of free market environmentalism,
however, that is more realistic than the stronger version just pre-
sented.  The weaker version maintains that (1) privatization is a le-
gitimate (sometimes preferable) option, which should be considered
in comparative institutional analyses for policymaking; and (2) the
choice of institution (public ownership/regulation versus unregulated
private ownership) is not a once-and-for-all decision but is contingent
on changing institutional and technological circumstances.97
This weaker version of free market environmentalism appears
uncontroversial, although it correctly implies an important considera-
tion that conventional welfare economists often neglect: there is no
such thing as a pure “public good.”  “Public goods” are determined
economically by reference to the rates of supply and demand and the
costs of privatization, given the technological capabilities of the time.
Because technological capabilities and rates of supply and demand
are subject to change, something that is deemed a “public good” to-
day, such as the atmosphere, may become efficiently privatize-able at
some time in the future.98  Anderson and Hill have pointed out, for
example, that the innovation of barbed wire in the 1870s greatly re-
duced the cost of enclosing land, thereby facilitating the settlement
and privatization of public lands in the western United States.99  Be-
RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: SOCIAL AND ECOLOGICAL ISSUES 15, 18 (Susan Hanna &
Mohan Munasinghe eds., 1995).
96. Gary Libecap’s book, Contracting for Property Rights, is exceptional in providing his-
torical and empirical transaction cost analyses.  But his findings hardly support the complete
privatization of all environmental goods.  Rather, Libecap’s analyses explain why some “open
access” resources have been privatized, while others have been subjected to public owner-
ship/regulatory control or remain “open access.” See GARY D. LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR
PROPERTY RIGHTS (1989).
97. This weaker version of free market environmentalism is usually presented implicitly,
rather than explicitly. See, e.g., ROBERT H. NELSON, PUBLIC LANDS AND PRIVATE RIGHTS:
THE FAILURE OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT 218-24 (1989) (advocating the privatization of
some public lands).
98. It should be noted, however, that historical change is not uni-directionally towards pri-
vate property.  Property rights sometimes evolve in the opposite direction, from more sharply
defined private rights to more ambiguous correlative rights.  This has been the case, for exam-
ple, with water law. See generally Carol M. Rose, Energy and Efficiency in the Realignment of
Common-Law Water Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261 (1990).
99. See Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the
American West, 18 J.L. & ECON. 163, 172 (1975).  See also Cole & Grossman, supra note 25,
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cause what counts as a “public good” can change, it is vital that insti-
tutional choices not become reified; they must remain subject to revi-
sion as ever-changing circumstances alter comparative institutional
analyses.
The weaker version of free market environmentalism is not con-
sistent with the stronger one.  The weaker version recognizes that the
best mixture of property rights and regulatory regimes depends on in-
stitutional and technological factors, while the stronger version posits
that all environmental goods should be completely privatized for op-
timal efficiency and environmental protection.  The stronger version
implicitly rejects the concept of “public good” in its entirety, so that
there is no longer any point in engaging in comparative institutional
analyses for public policymaking.  It simply dispenses with the contest
and declares victory on behalf of total and final privatization.
PROPOSITION IV.
PRIVATIZATION OF RESOURCE USERS AND POLLUTERS IS MORE
IMPORTANT THAN PRIVATIZATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS IN
THE REAL (SECOND-BEST) WORLD, FOR REASONS OF REGULATORY
EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS.
One issue concerning the relation between property rights and
environmental protection that almost no one addresses (perhaps be-
cause it is so obvious) is the critical importance of private ownership
of resource users and polluters for effective and efficient environ-
mental protection.  Indeed, as the author has argued elsewhere,100
public ownership of polluters and resource users is likely, for reasons
of regulatory efficiency, to be far more detrimental to environmental
protection efforts than public ownership of the environmental goods
themselves.
Private ownership of resource users and polluters averts the
regulatory conflict of interest that inevitably arises whenever the gov-
ernment owns the very enterprises it is responsible for regulating, e.g.,
for environmental protection.  The Hungarian economist János Kor-
nai has famously explained how governments invariably soften
budget constraints for state-owned enterprises, relieving them from
the competitive pressures of the marketplace, i.e., the need to profit
921-22, 933-34 (arguing that the development of cost-effective continuous emissions monitoring
systems between the mid-1970s and 1990 made marketable permit programs a feasible, and in
some cases preferable, alternative to technology-based command-and-control regulation).
100. See COLE, supra note 8, at 227-28.
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to survive.101  The French jurist Laurent Cohen-Tanugi has noted a
similar softening of law constraints—the state relaxes regulatory
standards and enforcement against enterprises in which it has a direct
financial stake.102
Softened budget and law constraints pose a great threat to effec-
tive and efficient environmental protection and resource conserva-
tion.  More than any other institutional factors, they explain the envi-
ronmental and economic failings of communism.103  Polluters and
resource users throughout the former Soviet Bloc were systematically
insulated from the enforcement and fiscal consequences of environ-
mental laws and regulations.  Consequently, the communist countries
of Europe suffered from environmental crises unparalleled in human
history.  But since communist institutions were replaced by demo-
cratic and market institutions beginning in 1989, former Soviet Bloc
countries have experienced remarkable improvements in environ-
mental protection.
In Poland, for example, the private sector’s share of economic
growth has overtaken the residual public sector.104  Budget and law
constraints have hardened for almost all sectors of the economy
(mining being a notable exception), leading to improved economic
and environmental performance.105  Poland’s economy has been
among the fastest growing in Europe for several years running.106
Meanwhile, pollution emissions have declined dramatically and con-
tinuously since 1990.107  Indeed, environmental protection is among
the great (and under-appreciated) success stories of the transition to
market democracy throughout Eastern Europe.
101. See, e.g., János Kornai, The Soft Budget Constraint, 39 KYKLOS 3, 13-21 (1986) (de-
scribing the softening of budget constraints in Hungary, Yugoslavia, and China, and concluding
that “[s]ocialist economies exhibit a rather extreme degree of budget constraint softness”);
COLE, supra note 8, at 152-53..
102. See LAURENT COHEN-TANUGI, LE DROIT SANS L’ÉTAT: SUR LA DÉMOCRATIE EN
FRANCE ET EN AMÉRIQUE (1985).
103. See COLE, supra note 8, at 146-53.  The environmental failure of communism may pro-
vide the clearest illustration of the regulatory conflict of interest that arises when the state owns
the enterprises it is charged with regulating.  But it is far from the only example.  The problem
arises virtually whenever the state owns polluters and resource users.  Consider the differential
treatment in the United States (and other countries) of privately owned versus publicly owned
nuclear power. See id. at 149-50.  Privately owned nuclear power plants (overseen by the Nu-
clear Regulatory Commission) have been policed far more effectively and transparently than
federally owned nuclear facilities (overseen by the Departments of Defense or Energy).  See id.
104. See id. at 190, 197.
105. See id. at 197-99.
106. See id. at 193.
107. See id. at 192.
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A free market environmentalist might wonder, however, whether
environmental protection might have improved even more in post-
communist Poland had the State privatized not only state-owned en-
terprises (polluters and resource users) but the environmental goods
themselves (e.g., public lands, forests, and waterways).  Perhaps, but
there is reason for doubt.  In Poland’s case at least, public ownership
of environmental goods did not automatically give rise to the regula-
tory conflicts of interest that resulted from public ownership of pol-
luters and resource users.
In the 1960s to 1980s, as Poland became one of the world’s most
polluted countries, it managed to retain approximately 27 percent of
its territory in “natural” condition.108  As the economist Tomasz ylicz
has explained,
[B]ecause the communist industrialization concentrated in areas of
traditionally high intensity of production, vast regions remained
largely underdeveloped.  These regions and their almost intact
natural capital represent an asset which is becoming increasingly
scarce in Europe[;] . . . about 8.5 percent of the area of [Poland]
remains relatively unscathed by development.  Commercial forests
and farms operating within sustainable and ecologically acceptable
principles include about 19 percent of Polish territory.  Hence, over
a fourth of Poland represents an asset that many areas of Europe
no longer have.109
Where the state did not provide an opportunity to exploit, develop, or
pollute publicly owned resources, those resources, including many
publicly managed national parks and forest reserves, remained “in
their natural state.”110  As a consequence, post-communist Poland re-
tains ecological assets no longer found in the rest of Europe, including
the last stands of primeval European forest and the last free-roaming
herds of European bison.
Poland’s experience challenges the free market environmental-
ists’ fundamental premise that public ownership of environmental
goods works just as badly for economic efficiency and environmental
108. See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE REVIEWS: POLAND 88 (1995) (“In 1991, while 11 per cent
[sic] of Poland was considered to be ‘severely environmentally threatened’, 27 per cent [sic] was
in natural or close to natural state.”) [hereinafter OECD, POLAND].
109. Tomasz ylicz, Will New Property Right Regimes in Central and Eastern Europe Serve
the Purposes of Nature Conservation,” in PROPERTY RIGHTS IN A SOCIAL AND ECOLOGICAL
CONTEXT: CASE STUDIES AND DESIGN APPLICATIONS 63, 64 (Susan Hanna & Mohan
Munasinghe eds., 1995); see also COLE, supra note 8, at 229 (quoting the same passage).
110. OECD, POLAND, supra note 108, at 88.  Use of this quote is not meant to endorse the
concept of a uniquely “natural state.”
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protection as public ownership of other resources.111  This is not to say
that public resource management is optimal or even preferable to pri-
vate resource ownership.  The point is that the state of ownership
may not always be the key factor.  Other factors, such as management
policies, budget constraints, discount rates, economies of scale, tech-
nological capabilities, and even culture and ideology, may play more
important roles in specific cases.
This raises interesting questions for free market environmental-
ists.  Do their anecdotes of “government failure” in environmental re-
source management carry necessary implications for ownership?  Or
might they simply reflect curable defects in regulatory policy?  Inter-
estingly, virtually all of the free market environmentalists’ horror sto-
ries of government mismanagement concern environmental goods
subject to multiple-use management, which by its very nature (bal-
ancing economic development and environmental preservation val-
ues) generates regulatory conflicts of interests.112  A state agency that
has contradictory missions to exploit and preserve a single resource is
unlikely to do a very good (i.e., efficient or ecologically sound) job of
either.113  It seems clear, at any rate, that public ownership of envi-
ronmental goods does not always result in a tragedy of the political
commons, even in countries with generally woeful records of envi-
ronmental protection.114  But the more obvious point—that resource
users and polluters must be privately owned for environmental pro-
tection to be successful—may be even more important for policymak-
ers to remember.
111. See Stroup & Goodman, supra note 4, at 427.
112. One rarely finds “horror stories” of government mismanagement of dominant or single
use resources, such as Wilderness Areas, in the free market environmentalist literature.  Of the
dozens of tales of government mismanagement of environmental goods that Terry Anderson
and Donald Leal recount in Free Market Environmentalism, not one concerns resources subject
to single or dominant use management.  It is interesting to note in this context that privatization
of public lands would itself amount to a conversion from multiple-use to dominant-use man-
agement, with the dominant (but not necessarily exclusive) use determined by the interest of the
private owner.  But if the conversion from multiple-use to dominant-use by privatization is fea-
sible, then one wonders whether insuperable obstacles prevent the government from achieving
the same end by altering the management regime without changing the ownership structure.
113. See Michael C. Blumm, Public Choice Theory and the Public Lands: Why “Multiple
Use” Failed, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 405, 407 (1994).
114. By the same token, it is clear that private ownership does not always guarantee the
conservation of environmental goods.  See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION:
PROPERTY RIGHTS HAVE LIMITED UTILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
In the mid-1970s, when federal environmental regulation was just
getting off the ground in the United States, Nobel laureate Robert
Solow wisely cautioned that society should be as skeptical of uncriti-
cal centralization as of uncritical free-marketeering.115  Today, as some
economists advocate the complete privatization and deregulation of
environmental goods, it is worth bearing in mind that Solow’s admo-
nition cuts both ways.  There is no question that privatization—the
allocation of private property rights in environmental goods—is a
useful tool for environmental protection.  But there are good reasons
for skepticism about the blanket claims of free market environmen-
talists, especially in the international arena.
In the first place, it is difficult to imagine that any single social in-
stitution—including private property—could constitute a first-best
solution for all environmental problems in this second-best world,
with its wide variety of institutional and technological contexts and
complexities.  Moreover, it is especially difficult to imagine this in the
absence of transaction cost analyses, which would provide some basis
for institutional comparison and choice.  No doubt, transaction cost
analyses would often point to private property as a preferable institu-
tional alternative, at least in societies with well-developed institutions
to protect private property rights.  But the real world and global envi-
ronmental issues are far too complex and variable for the simplistic
(but not so simple116) solution proffered by free market environmen-
talism.
115. See Robert M. Solow, Richard T. Ely Lecture: The Economics of Resources or the Re-
sources of Economics, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 12 (1974).
116. It is one thing to advocate privatization and quite another to implement it in a politi-
cally feasible way, which is precisely why transaction cost analyses are so important.  There are
several methods by which a state could transfer public property to private owners, each of which
would benefit certain contenders over others.  Even auctions, which may appear to be the most
fair method (as well as the most remunerative for the government), have distributional ramifica-
tions.  Because willingness-to-pay reflects ability-to-pay, auctions clearly would advantage those
contenders with the largest pre-existing endowments.  Furthermore, contenders can be expected
to lobby, before the fact of privatization, for the privatization method that favors them over
competitors.  This political competition over the method of privatization inevitably increases the
transaction costs of privatization.
Historically, the U.S. government has only rarely utilized the auction method to privatize
natural resources.  Indeed, many of the cases of governmental mismanagement of resources
pointed to by free market environmentalists, such as below-cost timber sales in the National
Forests and below-market grazing fees on BLM lands, constitute inefficient, non-market alloca-
tions of (limited) public property rights to private owners.  See COLE, supra note 8, at 231-32.
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The best instrument for environmental protection ultimately de-
pends on technological and institutional circumstances that too many
economists and legal scholars neglect.  Because those circumstances
are highly variable, especially at the international level, no single ap-
proach is appropriate for every circumstance.  Indeed, for many coun-
triesespecially those with endemically soft budget and law con-
straintsinstitutional change itself is a prerequisite for any system of
effective and efficient environmental protection, no matter which
policy instrument is preferred in theory.
